


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# THE TASTE OF FREEDOM

THE BIRTH  
OF  
THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN  
CYPRUS  
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE





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
## "PILGRIMAGE

*...I was in Cyprus six months after the war, interviewing those who had escaped from the South after facing extreme hardship and torture. I was aware that I would not be the same after going through the Cyprus experience.*

*The island Turks put on a celebration of the Turkish military intervention on its first anniversary, with all the usual speeches and parades. As I watched one parade in Nicosia hand-in-hand with my little American born son who, in a sense represents my life in the United States, I began to cry as I saw old men marching. I regretted bitterly that my father, who had died a few years earlier, was not alive to taste the new freedom, and I felt him near me. I felt myself to be a link between him and the grandson he had never seen. The birth of a free Turkish sector in northern Cyprus was accompanied by the birth of a new ego in me; I seemed to feel the establishment of a firmer generational continuity within myself."*

(Prof. Vamik D. VOLKAN, *Cyprus-War and Adaptation, A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict.*)





Compiled by  
The Turkish Cypriot Human  
Rights Committee  
January 1984



# INTRODUCTION

When Cyprus became independent in 1960, it was hoped that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, as the two peoples of the island, would be able to live harmoniously side by side, sharing power conjointly in a binational Republic. But this was not to be. The Greek Cypriots and Greece, not content with independence, sought to bring about *enosis*-annexation of the island to Greece-and in three years time, destroyed the partnership State by use of force against the Turkish Cypriots.

The Turkish Cypriot People, for whom *enosis* meant subjugation to a foreign state, vigorously resisted all attempts to put an end to the independence of Cyprus and to destroy their political status, their legitimate rights, their very existence, identity and culture.

During 1963-1974, the Greek Cypriots, with Greek military assistance, raided isolated Turkish Cypriot villages and attacked the Turkish Cypriot quarters of the towns, pushing the Turkish Cypriots into ever more densely populated enclaves and forcing them to survive on their own meager economic resources.

In 1974, the Greek military junta organized a coup in Cyprus, proclaiming as "president" the terrorist Nicos Sampson, author of "extermination plans", and a criminal who boasted of having killed one person for every year of his life. The Turkish Government then intervened to protect the Turkish Cypriot People and to preserve the independence of Cyprus which would otherwise have ended through a declaration of *enosis*. The Greek Cypriots and Greece, in their campaign of aggression against the Turkish Cypriots, left no other alternative but the creation of a safety zone in which Turkish Cypriots could live free from fear.

Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, as the three guarantor States, noted on 30 July 1974 the existence in Cyprus of two autonomous administrations representing the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots respectively. They agreed that negotiations should be carried out to secure the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus and a return to constitutional legitimacy.

The two sides in Cyprus developed a negotiating process and an agreed framework for a



federal solution following the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975 as the Turkish wing of the prospective bi-zonal federal state. The Summit Agreements of 1977 and 1979, the UN Secretary General's Opening Statement of 1980 and the UN Evaluation Document of 1981 embodied the criteria and concrete elements for a new partnership under a federal arrangement.

The Greek Cypriot leadership, especially since towards the end of 1981, under the negative influence of Greece, constantly acted with the intention of undermining the negotiation process, of destroying the framework of the negotiations as well as eroding the major points of agreement on which the negotiations were based. All warnings and calls made by the Turkish Cypriot side were unheeded with blind intransigence.

In the face of the Greek Cypriot attitude, which is not compatible with the concept of a federal state and the concept of co-founder partnership; which does not recognize the right of the Turkish Cypriot People to live in security and freedom in their own zone, the Turkish Cypriots were confronted with the necessity of determining their own destiny, in order to bring to an end, once and for all, the 20 years old political uncertainty in the island.

It is not only Turkish Cypriots who think that the Greek Cypriot leadership has refused to negotiate in good faith. In April 1976, Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiator at the inter-communal talks, was forced to resign because he could not accept Archbishop Makarios's rigid stance in the negotiations. In July

1978, Tassos Papadopoulos, the successor of Clerides as Greek Cypriot negotiator, was in turn dismissed after he had castigated Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou for refusing to abide by the Denktas-Makarios Summit Agreement of 1977. Finally, in September 1983, Nicos Rolandis, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, resigned when Kyprianou rejected UN Secretary General's "soundings" to resume negotiations. A few days later, Rolandis went so far as to accuse Kyprianou of being "the enemy of Cyprus."

Greece and the Greek Cypriots are not at peace among themselves. Their failure is not only political, but also moral. As long as they refuse even to recognise that during the 1963-1974 period they carried out large-scale, brutal and totally unprovoked attacks upon the Turkish Cypriots, they will never understand the profound concern of the Turkish Cypriot People for their own security and their complete distrust of Greek Cypriot leadership. Consequently, the Greek Cypriots will never negotiate on a realistic basis with the Turkish Cypriots.



# THE NEGATIVE ROLE OF GREECE

The "Pan-Hellenic socialist" Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Andreas Papandreou invited members of the "Greek lobby" in the United States to Athens in late November 1983 in order to plan the launching of a propaganda campaign against one of the allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Mr. Papandreou took office in the end of 1981 following an election campaign based essentially on the promise of an anti-Western policy. For the last two years, the socialist rhetoric and policies of the Greek Prime Minister caused strains in Greece's relations with her NATO allies, including the United States, and with her partners in the European Economic Community.

Mr. Papandreou was criticized and lectured by a group of "Greece's friends on Capitol Hill", who sent him a letter in September 1983, following the shooting down of the Korean airliner. *"Our zeal for and activities on behalf of Greece in the US Congress are being seriously poisoned by the continuous rhetoric emanating from your office, which rhetoric is either anti-American in substance or implication"* Mr. Papandreou was told.

For the past two years, the final communiques issued following the Ministerial Sessions of the NATO Defence Planning Committee and the NATO Council car-

ried Greek reservations and objections on vital questions of Western defence and allied political approach to East-West questions, including:

- the INF deployments in Europe and the Geneva negotiations,
- Afghanistan and Poland,
- the security aspects of East-West economic relations,
- the use of chemical weapons in South East Asia and Afghanistan.

Disagreements of Greece with her allies inevitably extends to her relations with Turkey. Mr. Papandreou has deliberately chosen to keep Turkish-Greek relations in a state of tension, suspending all political dialogue and negotiations between these two allied countries in NATO's southeastern flank.

The American public and members of the United States Congress are being exposed now to anti-Turkish propaganda which violates every norm of decency. The pretext is Cyprus, which the Prime Minister of Greece paradoxically considers to be "a part of the national territory of Greece" in defiance of the bi-national independence of the island. The main themes of this campaign will probably ring a familiar sound, since it is an attempt for the re-staging of an ill-conceived exercise to involve the United States Congress in an affair which Greece has turned into a *Mediterranean Feud*.



Through such action, Mr. Papandreou is not seeking any improvement in the relations between the two peoples in Cyprus or between Turkey and Greece for that matter. The target is clearly the future of Turkish-American relations and cooperation.

Since his assumption to power, Mr. Papandreou has been bent on putting Cyprus back on fire, sowing new seeds of mistrust between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots who are bound to co-exist on the island. He has cast a dark shadow over the sustained negotiating process between the two sides, who had pledged to establish a federal structure, causing finally the disruption of this peaceful trend. He has over and over again interfered in the search for a negotiated settlement directly by the two peoples of Cyprus, who are the ones, as the two co-founder partners of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, to live, under an agreed solution of their own choice. He has forced his personal prerogatives on the communist-backed Greek Cypriot leadership in South Cyprus. He has tried to tear apart the very fabric of the intercommunal agreements that were the building stones on the way to a federal solution. As he had helped to put Cyprus at gun-point by arranging, as a Minister in the Cabinet of his father George Papandreou, the clandestine invasion and occupation of the island by Greek mainland troops twenty years ago, Mr. Papandreou has once more attempted to fulfil his "historic mission" by disrupting the peaceful trend in Cyprus directed at the creation of a bi-zonal federation of two equal partners.

On 24 November 1983, the Greek Prime Minister stated that "they" could only negotiate for a unitary Cyprus, and that neither federation, nor confederation was an acceptable solution.

The "Opening Statement" of the United Nations Secretary-General of 9 August 1980, which was in fact an agreed document between the two sides in Cyprus, made clear that:

"Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bi-zonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem."

*This is the mutually agreed and valid basis of a negotiated solution which Mr. Papandreou has been intent on destroying.*

A just and lasting settlement in Cyprus has been one of the principal objectives of Turkish foreign policy. All Turkish Governments have firmly supported the intercommunal negotiating process. Within this process, the Turkish Cypriot side has submitted comprehensive proposals on all aspects of the problem. As a result of the sustained efforts of the UN Secretary-General, the intercommunal talks were proceeding within an agreed framework encompassing all the fundamental aspects of the Cyprus problem.

*Turkey consistently urged the two sides in Cyprus to intensify their efforts to reshape their relations within a federal structure; to concentrate their attention on the dialogue; and not to be swayed by the counsel of those who would prefer a continuation of the conflict for their own selfish ends.*



Unfortunately, the Greek-Cypriot side was swayed by such counsel. In April 1983, they left the negotiating table and requested a debate in the UN General Assembly, knowing only too well that the Turkish Cypriot side, because it had no opportunity to address the General Assembly, would feel extremely frustrated and that international exploitation was incompatible with the negotiation process. The result was that the good faith created by uninterrupted intercommunal talks since 1980 was seriously eroded. The one-sided, unbalanced, unfair and unrealistic nature of the resolution adopted on 13 May 1983 served only to increase the resentment of the Turkish Cypriot People. The Turkish Cypriots rightly reminded world public opinion that they are as much entitled as the Greeks of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination. They had chosen to exercise this right with the aim of contributing to the creation of a partnership between the two sides within the context of a federal State. But if the other side rejected this partnership, they would have no choice but to reshape their own destiny themselves.

At a time when great efforts were being deployed to put the two sides on the road to dialogue and conciliation, the Greek Government unfortunately adopted a negative stand. The Foreign Minister of Greece declared in the UN General Assembly that a political solution to the question of Cyprus was quasi-impossible. He rejected the very basis of the negotiating process under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The historical responsibility for what has happened in Cyprus

since 1963 rests squarely with Greece. The present conflict has been the result of the constant political and military intervention of Greece and of her ambition to dominate the island. None other than the Greek Prime Minister himself admits this in his book entitled *Democracy at Gunpoint*. In it Mr. Papandreou gives a detailed account of the clandestine shipment of 20,000 Greek officers and men to Cyprus. That was in 1964. Ten years later, it was Archbishop Makarios who denounced before the Security Council what he called the Greek invasion of Cyprus.

During the years preceding 1981 the Greek Government adopted a more restrained attitude and decided to support the intercommunal talks. This position was reversed by Mr. Papandreou's Government and Greece has remained opposed to a negotiated settlement.



# CYPRUS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

## *The Turks of Cyprus*

Cyprus has been a homeland for Turkish Cypriots for over four hundred years. In the words of a distinguished American historian, *"The Turks of Cyprus have inhabited the island for over four hundred years, having reached their new home well before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, and even before the Jamestown Colony was founded."* **The Turks and the Greeks have lived side by side in the island as the two peoples of Cyprus with a different language, religion, culture and origin.**

**The co-existence of the two peoples in Cyprus has not created a "Cypriot nation". They have remained differentiated by historical, cultural and social peculiarities and each has adhered to an allegiance to its mother country on the mainland. Consequently, there is not, and there has never been a "Cypriot nation" in the island throughout its history. During the period of Latin supremacy, which lasted for more than three centuries, the population of the island was treated as no more than serfs with no specific identity or the means to sustain such an identity. When, therefore, the Turks arrived on the island in 1571, they were welcomed as liberators. The Ottomans, in consonance with their**

tradition of tolerance and system of government, allowed them to thrive as a cultural and religious entity alongside the Turkish population that settled in Cyprus.

Following the arrival of the Turks, the preponderant majority of the population of Cyprus was always composed of two culturally, ethnically, and religiously different and distinct peoples—the Moslem Turks and the Orthodox Christian Greeks.

## *Greek policy of "enosis"*

**Greece pursued a policy of Pan-Hellenic expansionism and attempted to annex the island through various means, including terrorism and violence.**

**The most elemental historical fact about Cyprus is that the island has never in its history come under the direct rule of Greece or the Greeks. In the early stages of its history, Cyprus was dominated by a variety of races and cultures. In more recent history, Cyprus successively formed part of the Persian and Roman Empires. Before the island was conquered by the Turks in 1571 to become part of the Ottoman Empire, it had been a Venetian dependency. The Venetian influence had, in turn, been preceded by the French Lusignan Knights in the**



13th, 14th, and 15th centuries until 1489. The Ottoman rule in Cyprus lasted for more than three hundred years until the administration of the island was transferred to Great Britain in 1878. The island was recognized as a British colony in 1923 and remained so until 1960, when independence arrived and Cyprus came into being as a bi-national State. Historically, then, Cyprus was never part of Greece, nor was it ever ruled directly by the Greeks.

During the years 1954-1958, Greece made several attempts to utilize the United Nations as an instrument by which to achieve "Enosis" under the guise of "self-determination" for only the Greek Cypriot population of the island. The pro-"Enosis" policy of Greece was rejected by the United Nations.

*The bi-national  
independence*

Britain agreed to relinquish its sovereignty over Cyprus to the two peoples of the island in accordance with an agreement to be reached between the parties concerned.

Therefore, Cyprus became, by agreement between the parties concerned, independent in 1960 as a bi-national state based on the partnership of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots.

The four interested parties accepted the documents and declarations leading to the bi-national independence of the island as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

The independent Republic thus established, undertook to ensure the maintenance of its inde-

*pendence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.*

Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, taking note of these undertakings, recognised and guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and the security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the basic articles of its Constitution. In the event of any breach of the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom were given the right to take individual action to ensure observance of those provisions in so far as common or concerted action proved impossible.

The Greek Cypriot leadership, however, did not accept, despite its solemn undertakings, the 1960 agreements as satisfying the "national aspirations" of the Greek Cypriot side. The Greek Cypriot leader publicly vowed to continue the campaign for "Enosis", although he had undertaken as the President of the new-born Republic "to prohibit all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State"

The evolution of the island's history cannot be understood fully and properly except in terms of this relationship between the Turks and Greeks and the consequences of this relationship over time. The emergence of Cyprus as an independent State must also be viewed in its proper context, that is, within the framework of the status of the Turks and Greeks vis-a-vis each other in Cyprus.

It was none other than this truth to which Archbishop Makarios was attesting when in 1963 he revealed with surprising candor



his conception of the newly independent Cyprus: "No Greek who knows me can ever believe that I would wish to work for the creation of a Cypriot national awareness. The Agreements have created a State, but not a nation" (Cyprus Mail, 28 March 1963).

Herein lies the paradox. The Greeks have never relinquished their misconceived illusion that Cyprus is Greek and that it should belong to Greece. Yet Cyprus has never been Greek nor has it ever belonged to Greece.

In view of the remounting campaign for the outlawed goal of "Enosis", violations of and attempts to alter the basic provisions of the Constitution, the Government of Turkey made, between February 1962 and December 1963, fourteen diplomatic representations to the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with her obligations as a guaranteeing power, non of which were heeded by the Greek Cypriot leadership.

*End of the  
partnership  
Republic*

In December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot partner of the bi-national Republic was violently ousted from the joint government and administration of the State. Turkish Cypriot houses and properties in 103 villages were destroyed. 30,000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees and sought security in enclaves held under constant armed attacks and an inhuman blockade.

This was the end of the legitimate order in the island as established by the 1960 agreements. A joint government or administration that embraced or represented both of the two peoples of the island ceased to exist. There was

no longer any territorial integrity or security for the Turkish Cypriots. There was no longer respect for the basic articles of the Constitution. These basic articles, as well as the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee had been violently and deliberately breached.

The Turkish Cypriot People were by physical force pushed outside the life and protection of a State which they had helped to establish only three years ago as a co-founder partner. The bi-national Republic of Cyprus was taken over and transformed into a Greek Cypriot Administration which regarded the Turkish Cypriot People not as a rightful partner, but as an alien element in a new "Hellenic State", who had to be subjugated and forced to bow to the will of the Greek Cypriots.

During these years, the major preoccupation of Turkey was the security of the Turkish Cypriot people in the face of Greek Cypriot armed attacks against Turkish Cypriot enclaves and areas, and the total collapse of the bi-national legitimate order in the island. Turkey as a guarantor power appealed to Greece and the United Kingdom to join her in a concerted action as envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee. Greece was deeply involved in the Greek Cypriot leaders' plot aimed at destroying the bi-national State and abrogating the agreements which had created that State. The United Kingdom was reluctant to take concerted action until it was too late to prevent the massacre of Turkish Cypriots and to salvage the bi-national legitimacy.



*The Turkish Cypriot Declaration of 15 November 1983 relates the destruction of the Partnership State of 1960 by the Greek Cypriots three years after independence.*

*The first paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence are reproduced below. Photographs and extracts which appear in the following pages document how the Greek Cypriots terminated in 1963 the binational State and sought to eradicate the Turkish presence in the island.*

# DECLARATION

## *Introduction*

Developments which have taken place in Cyprus for the last 20 years, and the critical stage which these developments have reached at present, necessitate the placing of certain facts with clarity before world public opinion.

We expect all those who desire peace and fundamental human rights to prevail on Earth, who reject discrimination among men on grounds of race, national origin, language or religious belief and who are against colonialism and racism, to give serious consideration to these indisputable facts, free from prejudice and preconception.

## *Destruction of the Partnership State by Greek Cypriots*

1. The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent State was based on the partnership of the Turkish Cypriot People and the Greek Cypriot People. This joint Republic, which

was established through the agreement of the two national communities, has been deliberately undermined and destroyed by the Greek Cypriot Administration since 1963. The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary of the partnership State, its entire Civil Service, from the most senior to the most junior ranks, have been usurped and taken over by the Greek Cypriots, placing them under the monopoly of only one of the two co-founder national communities.

Police and armed forces consisting exclusively of Greek Cypriots were formed and these armed elements have been used against the Turkish Cypriot People as an instrument of oppression and persecution.

For the past 20 years, the Turkish Cypriot People has been in a state of legitimate resistance and self-defence in the face of threats and attacks directed against its fundamental rights and freedoms, its political status and its very existence in Cyprus.





Charles Foley, a British journalist, recounts in his book how the Greek Cypriots created a "secret army" and used it against the Turkish Cypriots in 1963 to destroy the joint Republic. (*Legacy of Strife*, pages 167-169 and 186).

The "triumvirate" is seen above with Archbishop Makarios-Yorkadjis (left), Clerides (right) and Tassos Papadopoulos (extreme right), reviewing their accomplishment.

## Scorpions in a Bottle

Three of Makarios' most active aides persuaded him to approve the creation of a 'secret army' and formed a triumvirate to run it. These men were Glafkos Clerides, Deputy-President, Tassos Papadopoulos, Minister of Labour, and Polycarpos Yorkadjis. In practice, Yorkadjis soon became the real chief of this organization, while looking to the others for advice and help. His Robespierre-like prestige in Eoka, his intelligence network in every village, and the sweeping powers of his Ministry of the Interior made him the natural master of day-to-day decisions. Also, he was in personal touch with the 150 Greek cadets of the stillborn Cyprus Army – all ex-Eoka men who counted on him for their future – whose training courses might now be put to use. For overall planning the triumvirate counted on the Athenian expertise of friendly officers belonging to the Greek contingent.

Greeks began a crash training programme. Recruits were raised by former Eoka men in the villages and by civil servants, who sent in lists of likely names to the central authority. By December of that year the Greek Cypriots had 5,000 fully-trained men, with another 5,000 in various stages of readiness. Companies of 100-130 men were formed and from time to time there were practice

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alerts. (After the fighting started, a British officer was quoted as saying: 'They are as good as any non-regular troops I've ever seen; they had stretcher-bearers, radio communications, scouts, a rear-guard – the works.'

Greeks were enrolled as 'special constables' and given guns at police stations. The secret army groups were hastily rustled up and sent into action. A force of 100 men under Dr Vassos Lyssarides swept round both sides of the town. The Greek

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'specials' took over the English Club, which gave a field of fire over the main road to Kyrenia, and the Ledra Palace roof, which overlooked the moat and part of the Turkish quarter. Sandbags

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One thing was clear in Cyprus itself: by the time the harvest had been gathered in under the vigilance of United Nations troops the balance of power was unquestionably, and for the first time in modern history, on the side of the Greek population. Over the greater part of the island the Turks could move only on sufferance; Greek police patrolled almost everywhere, and it was only in Nicosia that the Turks held out in strength. Here, penned into their sector in tents and hovels, half of their total island community lived in a state of siege, dependent on supplies which reached them through the Greek lines: even water, electricity, and the telephone were available, without charge, at the hands of the 'enemy'.

the Greeks were

doing splendidly. Freed of the incubus of the Turks in the public services – £135,000 a month was being saved in salaries – they had plenty of work, good crops, a healthier trade balance than before. A 'people's army' was being built up and trained to use heavier armaments.





*Archbishop Makarios inspecting EOKA gun positions in 1964. "If Archbishop Makarios..... poses for photographers at the Greek Cypriots' gun position in his episcopal uniform, then I take this as a denial of all those moral values which were obtained in Europe at the cost of much blood and tears..."*


*(Extract from a letter written and published in 1964 by Prof. Ernst Benz, Professor of Theology at Marburg University.*



*A Greek Cypriot military parade in Nicosia on the occasion of the Greek National day on 28 October.*

*These troops were equipped with arms imported secretly from Greece and also from Czechoslovakia. The Greek Cypriot personnel swore allegiance to Greece, and Greece openly declared Cyprus to be "within the Greek Defence Area".*





Against such a background, the breakdown of the independence agreement seemed inevitable. It was triggered by Makarios himself in November 1963, when he presented Kuchuk with a memorandum proposing drastic changes in the constitution. The changes were

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intended to curtail the advantages of the Turks and create a unitary state. Ankara backed Kuchuk's angry rejection, and events raced beyond control, leading to intercommunal strife, which exploded on December 21. Towns and villages were littered with corpses; within months some 24,000 Turkish Cypriots fled their villages to seek protection in larger enclaves. Both sides accused each other of atrocities, but the sheer number of Greeks worked in their favor. Eventually troops from the British sovereign bases had to step in, and in 1964 a multinational United Nations force was dispatched to the island. Cyprus became laced with barbed wire, dotted with gun emplacements, and scarred by burned out and abandoned villages. Places of worship were desecrated; friendships were lost in the turmoil of fratricidal strife.

While useful in preventing a number of small incidents, U.N. troops were generally helpless in the face of major clashes. Thus, they merely stood by in August 1964 when a Greek force attacked the Turkish enclave at Kokkina, whose defenders were eventually aided by air strikes from nearby Turkey.

During the subsequent four years, the Turkish Cypriots were very much living in a state of siege on the island they were supposed to share with the Greeks. The enclaves were deprived of building material and gasoline on the grounds that they were useful for defense purposes (see Appendix A). The Greek Cypriots, who controlled the Nicosia airport and other ports of entry, instituted a ban on arrivals of male Turkish Cypriots of military age. Students wishing to return to their homes from Turkey and elsewhere had to be put ashore by Turkish gunboats off the Kokkina enclave to avoid immigration scrutiny. Letters to Turkish Cypriots were frequently returned; their businesses in mixed communities were often penalized by heavy taxes.

*The Mediterranean Feud by Andrew Borowiec,  
Published in 1983 by Praeger publishers, New York,  
USA.*





*Tents appeared on the plains for Turkish Cypriot refugees and in the six main towns the Turkish Cypriots sought security behind sandbags. Surrounded by hostile armed Greek elements, the Turkish Cypriots lived as defiant hostages in their own country until they were liberated by the Turkish Peace Force in July 1974.*







"Laced with barbed wire and scarred by  
burned out and abandoned villages..."

*The scene in Turkish Cypriot Villages and  
Turkish quarters of the towns after the "Bloody  
Christmas" of 1963.*





*In Küçükaymaklı (Omorphita) alone, 50 Turkish Cypriot houses were destroyed and 240 more damaged by Greek Cypriot gangs under the command of the terrorist Nicos Sampson, "Butcher of Omorphita".*



#### THE 1963-1964 CRISIS

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In Omorphita, the situation was even more desperate than in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia. The town had not yet been entirely evacuated by Christmas day. Yet, the defenders had run out of ammunition. Making the most of this opportunity, Nikos Sampson and his men redoubled their efforts to seize the town and, finally, overwhelmed the Turkish Cypriot positions. The 70-year-old *imam* (religious leader) and his crippled son were shot on sight, as were two other men. The 550 people who had remained in the town were then brutally dragged out of their homes and herded behind the Greek Cypriot lines. The mosque was shattered with bazookas and all the houses in the Turkish Cypriot quarter were looted or burned.

*(The Road to Bellapais, Pierre Oberling)*



*Two administrations  
in Cyprus*

The Turkish Cypriots never accepted the illegal Greek Cypriot rule over them and resisted against Greek Cypriot aggression from 1963 to 1974. While the Greek Cypriots, by usurping an existing State machinery, established a pure Greek Administration which had no relation with the bi-national Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots started to establish an Administration of their own in stages, on which they could depend for their needs and protection.

*Greek  
occupation*

The direct and heavy responsibility of Greece in the destruction of the legitimate order on the island cannot be overlooked or concealed.

Between 1964 and 1967, Cyprus was virtually under the occupation of Greece through its troops and officers smuggled into the island under a secret agreement reached between the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou and Archbishop Makarios.

On 27 October 1964 Makarios declared: "Greece has come to Cyprus, and Cyprus is Greece. I firmly believe that the Pan-Hellenic struggle for the union of Cyprus with motherland Greece will shortly be crowned with success."

A Greek Cypriot armed force called the "National Guard" was established under the command of the Greek General Staff and used later to mount many attacks jointly with Greek troops and under Greek army officers on Turkish Cypriot enclaves.

The military junta took over in Greece in April 1967, and in mid-

November 1967, Greek and Greek Cypriot forces launched a major attack on Turkish Cypriots in the Larnaca district of the island.

The brutalities committed during this attack provoked a strong reaction from Turkey. The immediate cessation of the attack and the withdrawal of Greek armed forces from Cyprus were demanded. The crisis was defused through the diplomatic efforts of the United States, and Greece agreed to withdraw her forces in Cyprus which had reached 20,000 over the years.

*The coup of  
15 July 1974*

It was discovered later that the withdrawal of these Greek troops had been only partially carried out and that several thousand mainland Greek troops and officers continued to be attached to the Greek Cypriot National Guard. The coup of 15 July 1974 in Cyprus was staged by the same Greek military elements and the EOKA-B terrorist organization under the direct control of the Junta in Athens.

The developments leading to the coup of 15 July 1974 constitute for the Greek - Greek Cypriot camp a shameful episode which they call the "Cyprus File". This "file" has remained closed to the present day despite public statements by both Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders to have it "opened". It will probably remain closed forever, since an inquiry into this "file" would reveal and expose their criminal actions, secret dealings and finally their internal quarrel on the method of terminating the independence of the island and dealing the final blow to the fate of the Turkish Cypriot People.



The Junta struck in the early hours of 15 July 1974. Within a few hours the broadcasting station was seized, the presidential palace was razed to ground by gunfire and the Nicosia airport closed to traffic. By the afternoon, Nicos Sampson, the notorious EOKA killer, was installed as "President" in Makarios's place. More than 5,000 Makarios supporters were put behind bars and the rival Greek Cypriot armed groups were mercilessly slaughtering each other. The losses were heavy not only among Greek Cypriots but also among the Turkish Cypriots who suffered from the consequences of the Junta's invasion.

*Makarios accuses  
Greece in the  
Security Council*

**Archbishop Makarios who escaped from the island described the coup in the Security Council in the following terms on 19 July 1974:**

"What has been happening in Cyprus since last Monday morning is a real tragedy. The military regime of Greece has callously violated the independence of Cyprus. Without trace of respect for the democratic rights of the Cypriot people, without trace of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek junta has extended its dictatorship to Cyprus. It is indeed a fact that for some time now their intention was becoming obvious. The people of Cyprus had for a long time the feeling that a coup by the Greek junta was brewing, and this feeling became more intense during the recent weeks when the terrorist organisation "EOKA B", directed from Athens, had renewed its wave of violence. I knew all along that that illegal organisation had

its roots and supply resources in Athens. I became aware that the Greek officers staffing and commanding the National Guard were recruiting members for that organisation, and they supported it in various ways to the point of access to the munition supply stores of the National Guard. In the camps of the National Guard, the Greek officers were conducting open propaganda in favour of that illegal organisation and turned the National Guard from an organ of the State into an instrument of subversion. Whenever, from time to time, I complained to Athens about unbecoming conduct by Greek officers of the National Guard, the reply was that if I had concrete evidence in proof thereof those found guilty would be recalled. From the whole tenor of their attitude, I received the unmistakable impression that their standard response was a pretence of innocence. A few days ago documents came into the hands of the Cyprus police clearly proving that 'EOKA B' was an appendage of the Athens regime.

"I do not know as yet all the details of the Cyprus crisis caused by the Greek military regime. I am afraid that the number of casualties is large and that the material destruction is heavy. What is, however, our primary concern at present is the ending of the tragedy.

"When I reached London, I was informed of the content of the speech of the representative of the Greek junta to the United Nations. I was surprised at the way they are trying to deceive world public opinion. Without a blush, the Greek junta is making efforts to simplify the situation, claiming that it is not involved in the armed attack and that the developments



of the last few days are an internal matter of the Greek Cypriots.

"I do not believe that there are people who accept the allegations of the Greek military regime. The coup did not come about under such circumstances as to be considered an internal matter of the Greek Cypriots. It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The so-called coup was the work of the Greek officers staffing and commanding the National Guard. I must also underline the fact that the Greek contingent, composed of 950 officers and men, stationed in Cyprus by virtue of the Treaty of Alliance, played a predominant role in this aggressive affair against Cyprus. The capture of the airport outside the capital was carried out by officers and men of the Greek contingent camping near the airport.

"It is enough to state on this point that certain photographs appearing in the world press show armoured vehicles and tanks belonging to the Greek contingent in Cyprus. On the other hand, the Greek officers serving with the National Guard were directing the operations. In these operations, they recruited many members of the terrorist organisation 'EOKA B', whom they armed with weapons of the National Guard.

"If the Greek officers serving in the National Guard were not involved, how does one explain the fact that among the casualties in battle were Greek officers whose remains were transported to Greece and buried there? If Greek officers did not carry out the coup, how does one explain the fact of night flights of Greek aircraft transporting to Cyprus personnel in civilian clothes and taking back to Greece dead and

wounded men? There is no doubt that the coup was organised by the Greek junta and was carried out by the Greek officers commanding the National Guard and by the officers and men of the Greek contingent stationed in Cyprus and it was reported as such by the press around the globe.

"The coup caused much bloodshed and took a great toll of human lives. It was faced with the determined resistance of the legal security forces and the resistance of the Greek people of Cyprus. I can say with certainty that the resistance and the reaction of the Greek Cypriot people against the conspirators will not end until there is a restoration of their freedom and democratic rights. The Cypriot people will never bow to dictatorship, even though for the moment the brutal force of the armoured cars and tanks may have prevailed.

"After the coup the agents of the Greek regime in Cyprus appointed a well-known gun-man, Nicos Sampson, as President, who in turn appointed as ministers known elements and supporters of the terrorist organisation 'EOKA B'.

"It may be alleged that what took place in Cyprus is a revolution and that a Government was established based on revolutionary law. This is not the case. No revolution took place in Cyprus which could be considered as an internal matter. It was an invasion, which violated the independence and the sovereignty of the Republic. And the invasion is continuing so long as there are Greek officers in Cyprus. The results of this invasion will be catalytic for Cyprus if there is no return to constitutional normality and if democratic freedoms are not restored.



"I am obliged to say that the policy of the military regime in Greece towards Cyprus, and particularly towards the Greek Cypriots, has been insincere. I wish to stress that it was a policy of duplicity.

"For some time talks were going on between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in search of a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, which on many occasions has occupied the time of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. The representative of the Secretary-General and two constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey have been attending the talks. The Security Council has repeatedly renewed, twice yearly, the mandate of the peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, expressing every time hope for a speedy solution of the problem.

"It cannot be said that up to now the progress of the talks has been satisfactory. But how could there be any progress in the talks while the policy on Cyprus of the regime in Athens has been double-faced? It was agreed by all the parties concerned that the talks were taking place on the basis of independence. The regime of Athens also agreed to that, and time and again the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the position of Greece on this issue was clear. If that were the case, why had the military regime of Greece created and supported the terrorist organisation 'EOKA B', whose purpose was stated to be the union of Cyprus with Greece and whose members called themselves unionists'?

"As I have already stated, the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are

also affected. The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks. The United Nations has a peace-keeping Force stationed in Cyprus. It is not possible for the role of that peace-keeping Force to be effective under conditions of a military coup. The Security Council should call upon the military regime of Greece to withdraw from Cyprus the Greek officers serving in the National Guard, and to put an end to its invasion of Cyprus."





*The Greek Coup of 15 July 1974*





In November 1973, the military strongman of Greece, Colonel George Papadopoulos, a comparatively mild dictator who was contemplating a liberalization of his regime, was overthrown by the chief of his military police, General Dimitrios Ioannides, a narrow-minded nationalist fanatic. Ioannides, while serving as a major in the Cyprus National Guard during the 1963-1964 crisis, had befriended Nikos Sampson and had drafted a plan the aim of which had been to massacre the entire Turkish Cypriot population.<sup>9</sup> Disappointed by the rejection of his plan by Makarios and by the latter's political opportunism, he had come to loathe what he was later to characterize as "the treacherous ways of the Red Bishop".<sup>10</sup>

By June, Makarios felt strong enough to reassert his authority over the National Guard, hoping to transform it from a center of opposition to his regime and a recruiting ground for future EOKA-B terrorists into a loyal force responsive only to the dictates of his government. To begin with, he decided to enforce a law to the effect that all candidates for officer training in the National Guard had to be

8. Markides, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

9. Interview with Archbishop Makarios in Oriana Fallaci, *Interview With History* (Boston, 1976), p. 318.

10. Theodoracopoulos, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

approved by the Greek Cypriot minister of the interior, and formally requested the Greek junta to comply with it. But the junta, which had deliberately flouted the law for years in order to limit officer training to Greek Cypriots who favored *enosis*, ignored Makarios' request. Thereupon, Makarios, obviously realizing that a showdown with Athens was inevitable, took two extremely drastic steps: on July 1, he reduced the length of military service of Greek Cypriots in the National Guard from two years to 14 months, a measure which would have substantially reduced the size of the force; then, on July 2, he sent to the figurehead president of Greece, General Phaidon Gizikis, and released to the press, a harsh and provocative letter accusing the junta of masterminding the campaign of terror in Cyprus. In this emotionally searing message, he charged that

the root of the evil is very deep, reaching as far as Athens. It is from there that the tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the Greek Cypriot people are tasting today, is being fed and maintained and helped to grow and spread. In order to be absolutely clear I say that cadres of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activity of the EOKA-B terrorist organization. . . . It is also known, and an undeniable fact, that the opposition Cyprus press, which supports the criminal activity of EOKA-B and which has its sources of finance in Athens, receives guidance and line from those in charge of the 2nd General Staff Office and the branch of the Greek Central Intelligence Services in Cyprus. . . . Even the evil spirit which possesses the three defrocked Cypriot Bishops who have caused a major crisis in the Church emanated from Athens.

He then added:

I have more than once so far felt and in some cases I have almost touched a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence.

He reminded the junta that

I am not an appointed prefect or *locum tenens* of the Greek government in Cyprus, but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and I demand an appropriate conduct by the National Center towards me.

Finally, he demanded that all of the 650 Greek officers staffing the National Guard be recalled by the Greek government.<sup>11</sup>

11. For a complete text of the letter, see Appendix VIII.

Makarios undoubtedly expected the unpopular Ioannides regime to give in to his demands. Perhaps he even hoped to force it out of office, thereby not only saving his own political neck but also ridding the Greeks of a hated tyranny. But the junta took on the challenge. It ordered the National Guard to seize power and kill Makarios.

At that time, the National Guard consisted of 10,000 officers and men. Among these were thirty-five Air Force officers who supervised the two radar stations on the island and 150 naval officers and sailors who operated one patrol boat, the "Leventis", and five torpedo boats. Although the National Guard had no air force to speak of, it possessed thirty-eight Russian T-34 tanks.

Makarios' forces consisted mostly of the 4,000 *Epikouriki* (auxiliaries of the Tactical Reserve Force). These were provided with Soviet-made AK-47's, Czechoslovakian anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns but had at their disposal only four British-made tanks which had been smuggled into Cyprus in crates marked "refrigerator trucks"

The Greek coup (code-named "Operation President") was planned to start after morning rush hour on Monday, July 15. The primary targets were to be the Archbishopric, the Presidential Palace, the International Airport, the telecommunications center and the headquarters of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. But by far the most important part of the operation was to be the elimination of Makarios. It was assumed by the Greek leaders that once this had been accomplished all resistance would automatically cease.

However, the National Guardsmen blundered badly. Instead of ambushing Makarios early that morning as he made his way to Nicosia from his summer retreat in the Troodos mountains with only a light escort, they waited until he had reached the comparative safety of the Presidential Palace—because that is what the plan called for. Then the storming of the palace itself was bungled. The compound, which was protected by 150 *Epikouriki* and 40 presidential guards, was surrounded by 25 tanks and a large number of commandos and then attacked from several sides simultaneously. But

.....  
thinking that the palace's defenders were much more numerous than they actually were, the various assault teams advanced cautiously, wasting a lot of time in the process. When the defenders knocked out the lead tank in the main, or frontal, assault with bazooka fire, the other tanks all opened fire on the palace, where Makarios was greeting a delegation of Greek children from Cairo. The barrage reduced much of the palace to rubble, but it also killed many of the commandos who were attacking the compound from the opposite side. The *Epikouriki* and the presidential guards fought on heroically for nearly three hours. However, the attackers remained confident of the success of their mission. They even prematurely announced Makarios' death, prompt-



ing the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, which had already been captured, to exultantly proclaim: "Makarios is dead. Long live the National Guard! Hellenism lives in Cyprus!"<sup>12</sup> But Makarios was still very much alive. As soon as the shelling had started, he had instructed the visiting children to lie on the floor. Then, divesting himself of his clerical garb, he had taken advantage of the National Guard's poor coordination and the momentary confusion caused by the malfunctioning of the Russian-made tanks (which were not suited to run in high temperatures and had been improperly serviced) and the accidental shelling of the commandos who were attacking the compound from the rear, to exit through a back door with two aides and make good his escape through the National Guard's lines.

Once out of the battle zone, Makarios and his companions hailed a passing car. But it quickly ran out of gas. Luckily, another vehicle soon appeared and was in turn commandeered. Thus, Makarios was able to leave Nicosia unnoticed. That afternoon, he reached Paphos which, except for the naval station, had been entirely occupied by his followers. During this time, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation continued to play martial music and to announce the demise of the Archbishop.

12. Theodoracopulos, *op. cit.*, p. 46. This work contains the best description of the attack thus far available.

By 1 p.m., most resistance had ceased in Nicosia. Angered at not finding Makarios' body in the Presidential Palace, the National Guard set fire to what was left of the building. Meanwhile, Dr. Lyssarides had fled into the Syrian Embassy and his private army had dispersed into the Troodos mountains.

At 2:50 p.m. Nikos Sampson was sworn in as the new president of Cyprus by the National Guard. This choice of leader was disastrous. Not only was Sampson emotionally unstable (a fact which his first news conference graphically illustrated) but he was also devoid of administrative talent. As Theodoracopulos observed: "Any chance that the coup had of success disappeared when Sampson was made president".<sup>13</sup>

Later that afternoon, the National Guard occupied Kykko monastery and the Greek Cypriot quarter of Limassol, both of which were *Epikouriki* strongholds and had offered stiff resistance. But in Paphos, the supporters of Makarios still retained the upper hand. They attacked the naval station, forcing its defenders to flee. In the commotion, the retreating personnel forgot to destroy the telecommunications equipment. This gave Makarios the opportunity to announce to the world that he was alive and to urge his fellow-Cypriots to reject the new government. By Tuesday afternoon, when the National Guard was at last able to seize Paphos, Makarios had put himself under U.N. protection

and had been flown to the British sovereign base at Akrotiri by helicopter.

According to Theodoracopulos, "total casualties resulting from the coup did not exceed 150 dead and 500 wounded".<sup>14</sup> But shortly after the overthrow of Makarios, many of his supporters were killed by the rebels. A Greek Cypriot priest by the name of Papatsestos, who was the superintendent of the Greek Orthodox cemetery in Nicosia, admitted

13. *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

14. *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

to having buried 127 bodies during the period immediately following the coup. On July 17 alone, he was forced to bury 77 bodies in mass graves. One of the "bodies" was still alive when buried.<sup>15</sup> There were also massacres outside Kykko monastery and in the vicinities of Paphos and Limassol.<sup>16</sup>

The rise to power of the "Butcher of Omorphita", who was elected to the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives in 1969 with the slogan "Death to the Turks!", was greeted with alarm and dismay by the Turkish Cypriot community. As Rauf Denktas aptly put it, he was "as unacceptable as Adolf Hitler would be as President of Israel".<sup>17</sup>

On July 15, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of Turkey, having received overwhelming evidence of the junta's participation in the coup,<sup>18</sup> formally accused the Greek government of intervention in Cyprus. On the 16th, he sent a note to the British government urging it to cooperate with Turkey in enforcing the Treaty of Guarantee. On the 17th, he flew to London for talks with Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. He tried to persuade them to join Turkey in a military operation to preserve the independence of Cyprus. But the British were

15. Father Papatsestos' charges were first made public in the Athens daily *Ta Nea* and then reproduced in all the Greek Cypriot newspapers on February 28, 1976.

16. An Irish production director by the name of Derek Reed saw "bodies being buried in a mass grave near Paphos". According to him, "people who were told by Makarios to lay down their guns were shot out of hand by the National Guard" (*The Washington Post*, July 23, 1974, p. 11d). Near Limassol, a university student by the name of Argiris Kyriakides saw the bodies of Makarios supporters "thrown into graves four at a time" (*Ibid.*, p. 11 d & e).

17. Theodoracopulos, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

18. Not only were the 650 Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard involved, but also the 950 officers and men of the Greek army contingent on the island. Moreover, as *Newsweek* reported (July 29, 1974, p. 48):

On the night before the coup... more than 100 Greek army officers, dressed in civilian clothes, boarded an Olympic Airlines 727 for an unscheduled flight to Nicosia. The men were seen off by Col. Michael Pylkhos, a top aide of Ioannidis. Another flight carrying an additional 100 men followed them 24 hours later.



To the outside world, however, the Cyprus problem in early 1974 was not so much the issue between Greeks and Turks but the internal turmoil created by EOKA-B in the name of enosis. The terror campaign was not on the scale of the original EOKA action; nonetheless, bombs exploded on the island again, gunmen were hauled into courts, and arms caches were raided. These actions represented a growing challenge to the authority of Makarios, and the former monk from the Kykko monastery decided to act. In July 1974, in unusually blunt terms, he accused Greece of meddling in the affairs of Cyprus and ordered home the 600 Greek officers and noncommissioned officers who constituted the cadres of the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Enosis, at least as far as the Makarios government was concerned, was not politically convenient at that stage.

It has been established (with some degree of accuracy) that the Athens junta had planned to get rid of Makarios and install a regime favorable to enosis. The coup, apparently, was to take place in October 1974, but Makarios's decision to remove Greek officers required some form of immediate reaction. This occurred on the morn-

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ing of July 15, 1974, when units of the National Guard, led by Greek officers as well as parts of the official Greek military contingent, took over the radio station and attacked the presidential palace, the archbishopric, and such installations as the telecommunications center. Luck was with Makarios, as it had been during a number of previous assassination attempts: he fled the burning presidential palace and, without his cassock, was driven southwest toward Paphos past columns of rebellious national guardsmen shouting slogans of enosis.

All communications, internal and external, were cut in the classic tradition of all coups. Although the radio station in the hands of the rebels repeatedly stated that Makarios was dead, scattered groups of his supporters resisted for over two days. Troops of the Greek mainland contingent seized the airport outside Nicosia after an exchange of gunfire, and soon planes arrived from Athens bringing more military advisers and policemen. The paralyzing curfew was reduced on the third day, but shots still crackled in parts of Nicosia. By then it was known that Makarios had survived and had been flown to the safety of London from the British base at Akrotiri. Nikos Sampson, a former EOKA gunman saved from a British hangman's noose by a political amnesty, became the president of Cyprus. It was this choice that helped precipitate the decision to send Turkish troops to the island.

Sampson was a simple man, obsessed first by the struggle against British colonial rule, then by his hostility toward Makarios. Right-wing and anticommunist, he nonetheless regarded the USSR with some respect, mainly because of its policy of strength. Although in his capacity as a newspaper owner he was courted by the U.S. embassy in Nicosia and invited to visit the United States as an official guest he delighted in flippant anti-Americanism. Above all, Sampson hated Turks. He was photographed in the ruins of the battered Turkish suburb of Omorphita in 1963, waving the Greek flag. To the Turks in Cyprus and Turkey, Sampson symbolized the enemy.



## *Turkish Peace Operation*

Turkish intervention on 20 July 1974, following the failure of consultations and efforts for concerted action, in accordance with her rights and obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee, was a reaction to Greek fait accompli in Cyprus, after eleven years of restraint and patience. It ended a long period of oppression of the Turkish Cypriot People, preserved the bi-national independence of the island which would have otherwise ended through a declaration of "Enosis", and opened the way for the pursuit of a political settlement that should not permit a repetition of the pre-1974 events.

The communique issued by the Turkish Government on 20 July 1974 cited the following reasons for the exercise of the right of intervention by Turkey five days after the coup in Cyprus and one day after the speech of Makarios in the United Nations Security Council accusing Greece of aggression and occupation:

(i) A coup d'etat has been carried out in Cyprus by both the Greek contingent stationed in the island and the unconstitutional Greek National Guard which is under the complete command and control of officers from the mainland Greece.

(ii) The present situation in the island, as has emerged from the coup, has completely darkened the independent future of Cyprus.

(iii) After having fully evaluated the recent events which took place in the island and in view of the failure of the consultations and efforts it undertook in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 as one of the guarantor po-

wers, the Government of the Republic of Turkey has decided to carry out its obligations under Article 4-2 of the said Treaty.

(iv) The purpose of our peaceful action is to eliminate the danger directed against the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey's aim is to restore security and human rights without any discrimination whatsoever.

(v) Our purpose in Cyprus, a bicommunal State, is to get the intercommunal talks to start as rapidly as possible.

The Turkish Prime Minister, in his message of 20 July 1974, underlined the objectives of the Turkish Peace Operation as follows:

(i) It is acknowledged by the entire world that the coup of 15 July 1974 was manufactured by the dictatorial regime of Athens. In fact, it was much more than a coup. It was a forceful and flagrant violation of the independence of Cyprus and the international agreements on which this Republic was based.

(ii) Turkey is fulfilling her legal responsibility by taking this action. The Turkish Government did not resort to armed action before all the other means were tried, but to no avail.

(iii) This is not an invasion, but an act against an invasion. This is not an aggression, but an act to end aggression.

(iv) The Turkish Armed Forces are not going to open fire unless they are fired at. We are going to the island not for war, but for peace.

(v) We were forced to make this decision after exploring all the political and diplomatic channels.



(vi) I appeal to all Greeks in Cyprus who have suffered the atrocities of terrorism and dictatorship. Bury with the past dark days, the intercommunal enmities and strife that were the making of those same terrorists. Join hand in hand with your Turkish brothers to speed up this victory and together build a new, free and happy Cyprus. We are there not to fight you, but to end your plight.

However, all Turkish appeals and warnings were discarded for Nicos Sampson, who with the Greek Junta Leader Ioannides had planned the complete extermination of the Turkish Cypriots during the 1963-64 period, realised that he could turn the Turkish intervention to his own advantage. The arrival of the "common enemy" would unite all Greek Cypriots, and accordingly he opened the prison doors and let out the Makarios supporters he had imprisoned. He gave them guns to fight the Turks.

The Greek forces and the Greek Cypriot National Guard facing the Turkish Peace Force were not ill-equipped or badly trained militia. They were equipped with all kinds of modern weapons and possessed large stocks of ammunition. The Greek military high command and the Greek Cypriot administration had, during the previous eleven years, constructed extensive fortifications along the northern face of the Kyrenia range of mountains. From these positions, Turkish officers and soldiers were being shot and killed on the shores of the island they had come to save from anarchy, bloodshed and colonization.

*Geneva Declaration  
of 30 July 1974*

The Turkish Government agreed to the cease-fire decision of the United Nations Security Council that took effect on 22 July 1974.

The Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom held talks in Geneva from 25 to 30 July 1974. The Foreign Ministers of the three guarantor states signed and issued a Declaration on 30 July 1974 which *noted the existence in practice in Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot Community and that of the Turkish Cypriot Community.*

The three Foreign Ministers also agreed that negotiations should be carried out with the least possible delay to secure:

a) the restoration of peace in the area, and

b) the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus.

Among the constitutional questions to be discussed, an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy was to be given priority.

They further declared that, in order to stabilize the situation, the following measures should be put into immediate effect:

(i) To establish a security zone at the limit of the areas under the control of the Turkish Peace Force;

(ii) To evacuate immediately all the Turkish Cypriot enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces;

(iii) To exchange or release the detained military personnel and civilians.



According to these agreed measures, the Turkish Cypriot enclaves to be evacuated by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces would continue to be protected by UNFICYP and would have their previous security arrangements. Other Turkish Cypriot enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish Peace Force would continue to be protected by an UNFICYP security zone and would maintain, as before, their own police and security forces. In mixed villages, the functions of security and police would be carried out by UNFICYP.

The important political conclusions drawn from the Geneva Conference and Declaration among the three guarantor states clearly indicated that there was *no constitutional government in Cyprus and that two autonomous administrations representing the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots respectively existed in the island. An immediate return to constitutional legitimacy was jointly defined by the three guarantor powers as the primary and urgent task of the two administrations in Cyprus. Constitutional legitimacy had been destroyed in 1963 when the Greek Cypriots seized by force of arms all the binational State organs and created a Greek Cypriot Administration that terminated all legitimate connection with the partnership State of 1960 and its Turkish Cypriot partner, who had no other alternative but to establish, in stages, its own Administration. These were the two administrations the existence of which were noted by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom on 30 July 1974. It was evident that the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus, would require the coming together of the*

two peoples in the island and their autonomous administrations under agreed terms of partnership to create a new political framework within which they could co-exist and cooperate.

It should be noted that before the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974, Nicos Sampson, the terrorist installed as "president" following the coup of 15 July 1974, handed over the so-called "presidency" to Glafcos Clerides who took the oath of office in the presence of a de-frocked dissident bishop and later on led the Greek Cypriot administration with the "ministers" appointed by Sampson for five more months. This political change took place before the Foreign Ministers of the three guarantor powers identified in their Declaration the need of the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus, taking into account the existence in practice of two autonomous administrations in the island.

When the three Foreign Ministers and representatives of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots met in Geneva for further discussions on 8 August 1974, it was found that none of the agreed provisions of the Geneva Declaration had been implemented by the Greek side. The Turkish Cypriot enclaves were still under Greek occupation, thousands of Turkish Cypriots were still being held as hostages, armed Greek elements were still harassing Turkish Cypriots and committing brutal atrocities. Indeed, for the majority of the Turkish Cypriots, the cease-fire of 22 July and the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974 brought no relief. The Greek Cypriot National Guard continued to attack numerous Turkish Cypriot villages. Others re-



mained under siege by the Greek Cypriot National Guard and EO-KA-B. So did the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Magosa (Famagusta). The Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of 37 villages, who had been forced to flee their homes, were living in utter destitution as refugees, mostly in Turkish Cypriot enclaves which were themselves under siege. In the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Magosa, which had been extensively damaged by artillery fire and which suffered from an acute shortage of food, the population had swelled to twice its normal size with the arrival of refugees from outside of the city walls. In the nearby village of Gönendere (Knodara), the population of 750 had grown to 3.000 as Turkish Cypriots from six surrounding villages had taken refuge there.

In Limassol and Larnaca, where the Turkish Cypriot quarters had surrendered after having been subjected to an intense artillery barrage, the men were herded into makeshift concentration camps while the women and children were left at the mercy of roving gangs of hoodlums. In Limassol, some 1.750 men were detained in the open, in the city's soccer stadium. In Larnaca, 873 men ranging in age from 12 to 90 were confined in a school building built to accomodate 100 students. The prisoners were limited to a diet of five olives, a small piece of cheese and a crust of bread per day. A tin of sardines was shared by six prisoners every other day. There were no doctors and medicines were unavailable.

By the time the Second Geneva Conference got underway on 8 August 1974, the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces had not yet started to withdraw from the Tur-

kish Cypriot enclaves which they had overrun and they held thousands of political prisoners. Furthermore, they did not cooperate to set up the security zone at the limit of the areas under the control of the Turkish Peace Force in northern Cyprus. As a result, the Turkish Government felt unable to adequately protect either the Turkish Cypriot population or its own forces on the island.

The Greek Cypriots and Greece dragged their feet when it came to complying with the provisions of the Geneva Declaration and resorted to deception and delaying tactics. They refrained from fulfilling any of their obligations under the Geneva Declaration and tried to prevent a serious discussion on the constitutional status of Cyprus.

Although not participating directly in the second Geneva meeting, the uncompromising spirit of Makarios weighed heavily over the Greek Cypriot delegation.

Upon the massacre of Turkish Cypriot civilians and the refusal of Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership to fulfil the conditions of the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974, the continuation of the peace operation became imperative on 14-16 August 1974.

#### *Massacres and mass graves*

The trail of blood and mass graves discovered following the operation horrified not only the Turks, but also the international mass media. Virtually, the entire population of three Turkish Cypriot villages (Atilar, Sandallar and Muratağa) including babies and elderly men and women had been massacred by their Greek Cypriot neighbours and dumped into



mass graves. 84 male Turkish Cypriots, between 13 and 74 years of age, had been taken away from the villages of Tokhni, Mari and Zygi and machinegunned in the Limassol district. The German newspaper *Die Zeit* wrote on 30 August 1974: "The massacres of Turks in Paphos and Famagusta are the proof of how justified the Turks were to undertake their second intervention."

The most significant confirmation justifying Turkey's intervention came from Nicos Sampson himself who disclosed on 15 July 1975, the first anniversary of the coup, that he was "about to declare enosis" when he was forced to quit "presidency". This illustrates the gravity of the threat to the independence of Cyprus after the coup.

#### *Exchange of population*

On 2 August 1975, the parties agreed to exchange their population on a voluntary basis. UNFICYP undertook to help in this exchange programme and the Turkish Cypriot people in its entirety settled in Northern Cyprus, while the Greek Cypriots moved into Turkish villages and properties in the south. In order to save themselves from oppression and tyranny and from the constant danger of being annihilated, thousands of Turkish Cypriots who had been living in South Cyprus had already clandestinely crossed over to the North, leaving all their belongings behind and at the risk of their lives. By September 1975, the remaining 10,000 Turkish Cypriots who had taken refuge in the British Sovereign Base Area, or held as hostages in the South were transferred to the North. Through the population

exchanges, all Turkish Cypriots were, for the first time, free from fear.

#### *In search of a federal solution*

The search for a negotiated settlement in Cyprus has gained an established framework only after 1974 through the Summit Agreements between the leaders of the two sides and the persistent efforts of the UN Secretary General.

The framework for a political solution based on a federal system and its concrete elements are embodied in the following basic documents:

— The 1977 Denktas-Makarios agreement,

— The 1979 Denktas-Kyprianou ten-point agreement,

— The UN Secretary General's "Opening Statement" of 1980,

— The UN "Evaluation Document" of 1981.

These basic documents which constitute the valid framework for a federal solution of the Cyprus problem, have all been worked out with mutual consent under the auspices of the UN Secretary General during the period that followed the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975 as the Turkish Cypriot wing of a future bi-zonal federation. Progress in this direction has been arduous because of the following Greek Cypriot attitude:

— The proposal made by the Turkish Cypriot side in 1975 for the establishment of a "transitional joint Government" pending a final comprehensive solution was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side.



Their wrath turned against the United States. On August 19 screaming crowds besieged the four-story U.S. embassy building, setting cars afire, including that of Ambassador Rodger Paul Davies, who had arrived on the island barely three weeks before the July 15 coup. Banners proclaiming "Kissinger murderer" and "America must pay" were hoisted over the heads of the crowds. As shots rang out from an unfinished building near the embassy, hysterical women shrieked, "Kill them! Kill them!" Davies fell in the corridor outside his office, killed by a high velocity bullet, which had penetrated the wall. Another bullet killed his Maronite Cypriot secretary, Antoinette Varnava. Clerides arrived at the scene shortly afterwards, while crowds still shouted, "Americans must die!" He denounced "this

To many Greek Cypriots, the United States remained the scapegoat for their island's problems. When, in January 1975, Turkish Cypriots camping at British bases were flown to Turkey to be resettled in the north of Cyprus, crowds set fire to the U.S. embassy in Nicosia. Makarios, who in the meantime had returned from his exile, apologized and promised to pay for the damage.

For several years no one investigated the assassination of Ambassador Davies, and some of those involved bragged about their exploits in tavernas. Eventually, in May 1977, two former policemen and a civilian accomplice were brought before the courts. It was almost a festive occasion; the accused laughed and were cheered by well-wishers, while government witnesses were intimidated and threatened. The defense argued that no one should be accused of killing Davies because he had not been a visible target, being behind a wall inside the embassy building. After a five-week trial, Ioannis Ktimatias, a former police sergeant, was sentenced to seven years in prison "for possessing and using an automatic weapon in the course of a violent demonstration outside the American embassy building" and for "participating in a riot and causing malicious damage to the embassy building." Another man, Neoptolemos Leftis, received a sentence of five years in prison for "possessing an automatic weapon and for participating in the riot." Both men were released in July 1978, a little over a year after the sentencing.



—At the Denktas-Makarios Summit Meeting of 12 February 1977, the two sides reached agreement on the establishment of a *bi-communal, bi-zonal federation*. The existence of the concept of "bi-zonality" in this Agreement was personally confirmed by the Secretary General of the United Nations, who was present at the Summit Meeting. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot "Foreign Minister" stated both in the UN Security Council and the plenary of the UN General Assembly, in August and September 1977 respectively, that there was indeed an agreement on the concept of "bi-zonality". However Mr. Kyprianou, who became the Greek Cypriot "President" after the death of Archbishop Makarios in August 1977, persistently denied this fundamental element of the Denktas-Makarios Agreement.

## 26 *The Denktas-Makarios 'Guidelines'*

To break the ice, I wrote a letter to Archbishop Makarios on 9 January 1977, proposing a direct meeting to discuss all aspects of the Cyprus problem and pointing out that without such a meeting, during which a basic approach to the problem could be worked out, the interlocutors would be unable to make progress even if they were to begin talks. Makarios accepted the invitation and two meetings took place in Nicosia: the first one on 27 January 1977 and the second on 12 February 1977. At the second meeting, which was also attended by the UN Secretary-General, it was agreed to resume the talks in Vienna under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General at the end of March. The following instructions were drawn up as guidelines for the interlocutors as a basis for future negotiations:

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.
4. The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.<sup>39</sup>

(*The Cyprus Triangle, Rauf R. Denktas*)



*The First Summit Meeting of 27 January 1977*



—In April 1978, the *Turkish Cypriot side made comprehensive proposals setting out the Turkish Cypriot position on all aspects of the Cyprus question.* The UN Secretary-General described the Turkish Cypriot proposals as

“dealing with the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem in a concrete and substantial way”. These proposals were hastily turned down by the Greek Cypriot side.



*President Rauf R. Denktas with Dr. Kurt Waldheim and Mr. Perez de Cuellar, the former and the present UN Secretaries General.*



—On 20 July 1978, Mr. Rauf Denktaş as President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, proposed the re-opening of the town of Varosha to the resettlement of Greek Cypriots. This proposal was also rejected right away by the Greek Cypriot Administration.

—The "Ten-Point Agreement" reached between President Denktaş and Mr. Kyprianou on 19 May 1979, raised hopes for progress towards an agreed solution. However, despite the commitment given by the two Cypriot leaders to adhere to a *concept of political truce* under point 6 of this Agreement, the Greek Cypriot side took the Cyprus question to

the meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries, in June 1979. The resolution adopted at this meeting in the absence of the Turkish Cypriot side, dashed all the hopes that were created. Continuing its internationalization efforts, the Greek Cypriot Administration sponsored a resolution at the meeting of the Universal Postal Union held in Rio de Janeiro, in September-October 1979 which declared the postage stamps of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus illegal. The one-sided resolution adopted at the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana in September 1979 revealed once again the lack of good will of the Greek Cypriot side.



*The Denktaş - Kyprianou Summit Meeting in Nicosia which produced the "Ten-Point Agreement" of 19 May 1979.*



*The most recent phase of the series of negotiations, which had commenced on 9 August 1980 with the "Opening Statement of the UN Secretary General, continued until 14 April 1983 when the Greek Cypriot side left the negotiating table for another recourse to the UN General Assembly.*



—In November 1979, a mere five months after the Denktaş-Kyprianou Summit Agreement, the Greek Cypriot Administration took the issue to the UN General Assembly. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly in the absence of the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot side once again clearly demonstrated the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side and its refusal to accept the Turkish Cypriot People as its partner in Cyprus.

—All these unconstructive developments, strengthened the conviction of the Turkish Cypriot People, that the Greek Cypriots did not really want the establishment of a federal partnership in Cyprus. The resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in November 1979, reinforced the desire and the will of the Turkish Cypriot People to determine its own destiny and in Northern Cyprus a strong urge began to be felt for the declaration of an independent state.

Even at this phase, Turkey called on the Turkish Cypriot People to act with patience, restraint and moderation. Turkey urged the search for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem within the framework of a bi-zonal federal state, through the intercommunal talks and continued to support the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary General.

*The negotiating process  
of 1980-83—*

*The Opening  
Statement*

The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and Turkey welcomed the resumption of the intercommunal talks within the framework of the formula known as the "Opening Statement" of the UN Secre-

tary-General, which confirmed the basic concepts in the Denktaş-Makarios Agreement. Indeed, in the "Opening Statement" of 9 August 1980, it is clearly stated that "*both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bi-zonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem.*" It is also clearly stated in the "Opening Statement" that the "*security need*" of the Turkish Cypriot People will be taken into consideration. The Turkish Cypriot side accepted the "Opening Statement" without any reservation.

In contrast, the Greek Cypriot leadership reserved its position on the substance of the "Opening Statement" and continued to deny the fundamental concepts reconfirmed in this document.

*Partial interim  
agreement*

During the initial phase of the intercommunal talks, the UN Secretary-General made intensive efforts for a *partial interim agreement*. This approach called for the resettlement of the town of Varosha by Greek Cypriots under a provisional arrangement, in exchange for the removal of the Greek Cypriot embargo on the Turkish Cypriot People. Within this framework, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus brought concrete proposals to the negotiating table. The Greek Cypriot side refused to remove or even ease its embargo on the Turkish Cypriot People and no progress could be made through this approach.



*Comprehensive  
solution;  
Turkish Cypriot  
proposals  
of 1981*

Following the parliamentary elections in South Cyprus and the Presidential and parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus, an approach for a comprehensive solution was attempted as of July 1981. In this context, the Turkish Cypriot side made concrete and comprehensive proposals on the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem on 5 August 1981. These proposals of the Turkish Cypriot side also contained a map of territorial rearrangement. The Greek Cypriot side did not respond to these proposals and merely confined itself to a fruitless repetition of unrealistic positions.

*The UN Evaluation  
Document*

In October 1981, the UN Secretary-General put forward certain ideas, known as the "UN Evaluation Document", which were formally presented to the negotiating table on 18 November 1981. The Turkish Cypriot side accepted these ideas as a framework for negotiations.

Following Mr. Papandreou's ascension to power in Greece in October 1981, the intercommunal talks were adversely affected by the destructive attitude of the PASOK Government. Mr. Papandreou labelled the UN Evaluation Document as an "imperialist plan" and urged the Greek Cypriot side to reject it. Consequently, the Greek Cypriot leadership put reservations on points of substance of the UN Evaluation Document. Following are the salient points of this document:

a) A federal, independent, sovereign, bi-communal, non-aligned republic will be established, composed of a separate Turkish Cypriot and a Greek Cypriot province or federated state.

b) The federal legislative shall comprise two chambers: The chamber of provinces or federated states giving equal representation to the two communities, and a popular chamber.

c) The executive authority of the federation shall be exercised by a joint Federal Council.

d) On the territorial aspect, a rearrangement on the basis of 70 30 ratio is suggested.

e) A fund for the development of the Turkish Cypriot province or federated state shall be established.

f) International guarantees in relation to the status of the federation will be discussed at the appropriate level after agreement is reached on all other aspects.

*Negative factors:*

*Greek-Greek Cypriot attitude  
against negotiations*

In addition to his provocative statements, Mr. Papandreou paid an official visit to South Cyprus in February, 1982. The subversive effects of this visit on the efforts for a peaceful solution were clearly indicated by international news media.

Mr. Papandreou saw no harm in describing Cyprus as "part of the national territory of Greece". He attempted to distort the true nature problem and put all his weight against the continuation of the intercommunal talks. Greece formally presented a proposal to the UN Security Council in June 1982, envisaging the granting of "minority" rights to the Turkish Cypriots within a final solution.



The Greek Cypriot leadership, under the shadow of Mr. Papandreou, and using the Greek Cypriot "Presidential" elections in February 1983 as a pretext, slowed down the pace of the intercommunal talks as of February 1982. Under this pretext, the talks came almost to a complete stop in the fall of 1982.

Even in face of these developments, the Turkish Cypriot side kept up its hope that the Greek Cypriot leadership would act with reason following the elections of February 1983, and would contribute in a constructive manner, to the intercommunal talks. In this hope, the Turkish Cypriots acted with moderation and restraint, despite all the provocations.

These hopes and expectations were frustrated. The Greek Cypriot leadership once again, embarked on the futile road of international propaganda and first took the Cyprus problem to the Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi, in March 1983, and exploited the issue at the expense of the Turkish Cypriot side. Subsequently, armed with a one sided "Non-Aligned" resolution and acting in collusion with the Greek Government, it decided to take the issue to the UN General Assembly in May 1983.

In the face of these developments, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, as well as other interested States, stressing that an acrimonious debate on the Cyprus question in the UN General Assembly would have destructive effects on the negotiating process, tried to dissuade the Greek Cypriot leadership from this harmful attempt. The Greek Cypriot leadership and the Greek Government unfortunately, refused to take such advice into consideration.

### *Denial of the agreed basis*

In the UN General Assembly, the representatives of the Greek Cypriot Administration in very clear terms, rejected the "UN Evaluation Document"; they attempted to equate the Turkish Cypriot People, one of the two co-founder partners of the "Republic of Cyprus", with the minor religious groups in Cyprus. Such an approach showed that the Greek Cypriot leadership had no intention of establishing a partnership State with the Turkish Cypriots.

This intransigent attitude reached its peak with the UN General Assembly resolution of 13 May 1983 and caused justified indignation and resentment among the Turkish Cypriot People. The Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus adopted on 17 June 1983 a resolution expressing the right of the Turkish People of Cyprus to self-determination. Failing to heed this clear warning, the Greek camp continued to further provoke the strong sentiments of the Turkish Cypriots.

### *Frustration of the UN*

#### *Secretary General's efforts.*

The UN Secretary General undertook informal soundings in August 1983 directed at the resumption of the intercommunal talks. Mr. Kyprianou frustrated this attempt in collaboration with Greece. This fact was exposed and established by the disclosures of Mr. Nicos Rolandis, the former "Minister of Foreign Affairs" of the Greek Cypriot side, as well as by the public statements of Mr. Clerides and AKEL who severely criticized Mr. Kyprianou's dubious attitude.



*Further provocations  
by Greek  
Cypriots and  
Greece*

On 3 October 1983, Mr. Kyprianou declared in the UN General Assembly that he would never accept a solution which would take into account the conditions which came about after 1974. Thus the agreed framework worked out for the solution of the Cyprus problem, was finally rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. Greece repeated its position against the intercommunal talks which remained suspended since April 1983.

On 28 October 1983, on the occasion of the Greek national day, Mr. Papandreou displayed his mentality once again by describing Cyprus as "part of the national territory of Greece".

*Rejection of  
a summit  
meeting.*

President Denktas proposed a summit meeting with Mr. Kyprianou who first rejected this proposal and later, in the face of internal and external pressures, turned it into a tactical game of trying to shift the responsibility in this regard on to the shoulders of the UN Secretary General and of putting forward preconditions to evade a new summit meeting.

Turkey always supported the right of the Turkish Cypriot People to self-determination, and tried to see to it that this right would be used in the direction of a negotiated settlement. However, the attempts of the Greek camp to deny the co-founder partnership rights and status of the Turkish Cypriot People, both in the context of the negotiations as well as in the context of a federal solution, undercut all such efforts and left the

Turkish Cypriot people with no other alternative but to take steps towards determining their own future to put an end to the political uncertainty of the last 20 years.

*The Turkish Republic  
of Northern Cyprus*

On 15 November 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was proclaimed by the unanimous vote of the Turkish Cypriot Parliament. In recognising this independent Republic, the Turkish Government took note of the following peaceful aims and principles in the Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence, outlining the policy of the new State:

On this historic day," the Turkish Cypriots declared, "we extend once again our hand in peace and friendship to the Greek Cypriot People:

"a) We firmly believe that two peoples, who are destined to co-exist side by side in the island, can and must find peaceful, just and durable solutions to all the differences between them, through negotiations on the basis of equality

"b) The proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not hinder the two equal peoples and their administrations from establishing a new partnership within the framework of a genuine federation, on the contrary, such a proclamation can facilitate efforts in this direction by fulfilling the necessary requisites for the establishment of a federation. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, determined to make every constructive effort in this direction, will not unite with any other State.

"c) The Turkish Cypriot side desires the continuation of the mission of good-offices of the UN Secretary-General for a peaceful



and conciliatory solution of all the issues between the two peoples and urges the pursuit of negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General.

"d) We urge the Greek Cypriot Administration to abandon, once and for all, its illusion of "Enosis" which aims at subjugating the Turkish Cypriot People to a foreign State; to give up its false pretence of speaking on behalf of all Cyprus in the international field, to accept the fact that it has no authority whatsoever to represent the Turkish Cypriots and to facilitate the immediate taking of measures of good will on matters which can be resolved in the short term, with the object of narrowing the gap between the two peoples."

"We consider it our duty," **the Declaration went on,** "to announce that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus:"

"a) Is, and shall remain, faithful to the principles of the United Nations Charter,

"b) Shall adhere to no other policy than non-alignment,

"c) Shall, in her relations with the two Super Powers and with all other countries, attach the greatest importance to the need for peace and stability and for the preservation of the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and shall not join any military bloc,

"d) Shall endeavour to establish friendly relations with all countries and shall remain firmly decided not to allow any hostile activity against any country on its territory,

"e) Shall continue to adhere to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance,

"f) Shall strive to establish the closest possible ties and relations with the Islamic countries, the Non-Aligned countries and the Commonwealth."

**The Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence is based on the peaceful use of the right of self-determination and is aimed at achieving a federal solution of the Cyprus problem.**

The door is wide open to a federal solution. The question is whether the other side has the intention to step in from this door.

Turkish Cypriot  
good will  
measures

**President Denktas has on 2 January 1984 announced comprehensive measures of good-will with the purpose of facilitating the search for a comprehensive final solution to the Cyprus question. Turkey has wellcomed these proposals, and with the intention of contributing to the constructive efforts of the Turkish Cypriot side to create mutual confidence in the island, Turkey has decided to make a reduction in the number of the Turkish Peace Forces in Cyprus.**

**The proposed measures by President Denktas set out the general outlook and approach of the Turkish Cypriot side and cover:**

— the resettlement of Varosha,

— the re-opening of the Nicosia International Airport,

— the re-activation of the Committee on Missing Persons,

— and a detailed proposal on the general framework of the relations between the two sides for progress towards a final settlement.



The Turkish Cypriot side has strongly urged that the two sides build up their relations on a constructive basis and work towards a final compromise and reconciliation for a federal partnership, step by step.

The Turkish Cypriot side has proposed the establishment of an interim UN Administration in Varosha and the re-opening of the Nicosia International Airport to civilian traffic again under an interim UN Administration. These have been defined as two separate issues neither of which constitute a precondition for the other. The Turkish Cypriots have also made clear that holding of negotiations on these issues will be without prejudice to the respective positions of the two sides with regard to each others political status.

The offer to re-activate the Committee on Missing Persons aims at resolving this humanitarian question which concerns both sides within the previously established framework for this purpose. The Turkish Cypriot side has invited the Greek Cypriot leadership to also declare its readiness to participate in the deliberations of the Committee.

The proposal relating to the general framework of the relations between the two sides is designed to develop a common understanding according to which the two parties shall:

—Reaffirm their resolve to work for reconciliation and compromise,

—Undertake to settle their differences by peaceful means,

—Declare their commitment to peaceful co-existence,

—Undertake to respect each other's national identity, political equality, legitimate rights and interests,

—Refrain from hostile propaganda directed against each other.

The two sides shall also explore all avenues for developing cooperation in various fields between the two peoples of the island. Detailed proposals have been made in this regard.

—Finally, it is proposed that the two leaders meet to discuss the process of steadily moving towards a federal arrangement and to give guidance to their representatives who will enter into negotiations for a final settlement.

The Cyprus issue must be approached by evaluation of the facts and the merits within the confines of the problem itself. This is the only sound approach. Today there are two independent states in the island representing the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots respectively. The only way to create an entity that will embrace and represent both of the two peoples of Cyprus is the establishment of a federal union by negotiations and by mutual agreement.

Attempts to isolate the Turkish Cypriot People and political exploitation in the international field are bound to be counter-productive and will not serve any useful purpose for achieving an agreed solution in Cyprus. In order to bring about conditions that can lead to an agreed solution between the two sides in the island, these facts need to be carefully taken into account by all who wish to see a reconciliation in Cyprus.



## TWO LETTERS

On 21 September 1983, Mr. Nicos Rolandis, the former Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, sent his letter of resignation to Mr. Spiros Kyprianou, leader of the Greek Cypriot Community in South Cyprus. Extracts from an English translation of this letter, which was made public by Mr. Rolandis, are given below.

The second letter reproduced in this section was sent by Mr. Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, to the UN Secretary General on 15 November 1983.

These two letters illustrate the falsity of the Greek Cypriot claim that the declaration of independence has frustrated a promising initiative by the UN Secretary General with a view to promoting the resumption a dialogue between the two sides in Cyprus. Both AKEL and DISI, two major Greek Cypriot political parties, have supported the views expressed by Mr. Rolandis in his letter of resignation and have opposed the dubious policies of Mr. Kyprianou, who insists on rejecting the concept of negotiations.



## LETTER OF RESIGNATION OF MR. NICOS ROLANDIS

21 September 1983

In May 1978 two months after I was appointed as Foreign Minister, the then Prime Minister of Greece Mr. Constantine Karamanlis said to me: "Mr. Minister, you should always have an envelope in your pocket with your letter of resignation ready, and you should not hesitate to use it when your conscience dictates you to do so."

I believe, Mr. President, that the time has come when I should deliver you this envelope.

Both we and the Greek Government encouraged the Secretary General of the United Nations to go ahead with his initiative to lead the Cyprus problem out of a difficult and dangerous impasse. We knew or we should have known that his initiative could not coincide with our position. Because in that case it would have no chance of success. We also knew that his initiative would have been critical, because its failure could lead to possible catastrophe. If we were not ready to face it, we should not have encouraged him.

On 8th August the Secretary-General announced his initiatives on some aspects of the Cyprus problem. In fact, he raised these questions:

"Instead of negotiating from your current positions, which are far apart, are you prepared to narrow the gap and restrict your negotiations within the framework of limited indicators? Are both sides prepared to move in a direction which will bring them closer at a common point, the point of a possible solution of the Cyprus problem?"

I believe the method of the Secretary-General was correct and that our reply should have been simple and positive. Talks within the framework of the indicators proposed by the Secretary-General should have been accepted without much alterations and with short explanations.

It was then that most of the hesitations started to appear. There were talks about traps and partition as well as non-existent national dangers. The Secretary-General, who was until then our friend, suddenly became our foe, as many others involved in the Cyprus problem did. I do not mean that personally you did all the above, Mr. President. Others shouted, but you stayed silent although, I am sure, you did not approve talks within the framework of the indicators (and this was one point of disagreement).



The General Secretariat of the United Nations has very sensitive ears. This is due to the fact that the Secretary General is not a mediator or arbitrator, but offers services within the framework of "good offices". Doubts or objections expressed by official or semi-official people lead him to reconsider his position in accordance with the messages he receives. Thus, when we met him in New York on 14th September we noticed that his indicators had disappeared, that what he was expecting from us was to express our position, a position which has already been expressed thousands of times, for the Secretary-General to proceed to a solution. This was an exit for the General Secretariat, an exit imposed on them. Don't you want indicators? If you don't, you would not have them. Don't you want negotiations? If you don't, you would not have them. Both we and the Greek Government accepted this change with satisfaction, and we accepted an initiative which in essence has no relation to the original initiative of the Secretary General.

Now I ask:

1. How is the Secretary-General of the United Nations going to find a formula for a comprehensive solution when we expressed political weakness and indicated to him that we could not accept even his first indicators as a basis for negotiations?
2. Where will the common denominators be searched for if we extend the disagreement to all aspects of the Cyprus problem instead of trying to narrow the gap between the two communities through the methodology provided for by the indicators?
3. What do we have new to tell the Secretary-General? Are we going to repeat things which he hears 50 or 100 times a year? Will the repetition of things well known to the Secretary General further enlighten him or help him to find a formula for a comprehensive solution?
4. What happens if the Secretary-General fails? Surely he will not attempt to burn his fingers again, and there is nobody else to undertake his operation. How will then the Cyprus problem be solved? With hopes, or with prayers? or resolutions? or with partition (if worse developments do not happen) which will be the outcome of our omissions?
5. Who will carry the responsibility for the lost indicators or the dangers emanating from the vacuum that will follow?

As I explained to you earlier, the new line the Secretary-General was forced at the end to decide, not only has no chance of success, but it includes dangers. It is for this reason that I decided to separate my responsibilities and resign.



Letter dated 15 November 1983 from Mr. Rauf Denktaş to the  
Secretary-General

At this crucial moment in the life of the Turkish Cypriot People, who by their own free will have decided, through their legitimate representatives in our Parliament, to exercise their right to self-determination to proclaim the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, I wish to inform you personally of what this step means for us as well as for the future of Cyprus as a whole.

In the face of constantly mounting provocations and the uncompromising, insincere attitude of the Greek and Greek Cypriot leadership, the Turkish Cypriot People have tried to restrain their frustration. They have patiently waited to see the emergence of the slightest sign of moderation and common sense that could allow a renewed effort by the two sides for exploring, through direct negotiations, the real chances of an agreed solution on the basis of equality within the existing valid framework of the inter-communal negotiating process.

For over a year and particularly since last May, all the efforts of the Greek and Greek Cypriot Leadership have been directed at destroying a sustained negotiating process in Cyprus, the basis on which this process rests and consequently the agreed points of fundamental importance leading to a bi-zonal federation, aiming at the restoration of a partnership deliberately terminated by them 20 years ago. This unfortunate attempt to demolish the only valid procedure that could lead to an agreed solution in Cyprus and to deny the agreed concepts and criteria for a federal settlement, was coupled with a persistent and blind attack on our political status as one of the co-founder partners.

We have, over and over again, called on the Greek Cypriot leadership to refrain from actions that would severely hamper the chances of reconciliation between the two Peoples of Cyprus. Our sincere calls were countered by propaganda rhetorics out of touch with any reality, by political intrigues (planned in collaboration with Greece, with the sole intention of deceiving world public opinion), and by sheer tactical manipulations. Such shallow practices could obviously deceive neither world public opinion, nor the Turkish Cypriot People, or for that matter, the more honest Greek Cypriots who felt the need to take a stand against the dubious and short-sighted policies of their own leadership. But these practices have done a lot of harm to the chances of a negotiated solution and have exposed the lack of political will and insincerity of the Greek Cypriot leadership. We have observed with regret that the side with whom the Turkish Cypriot People were negotiating was no longer the Greek Cypriot community, with whom we had to co-exist in peace in this island, but, on an ever increasing scale, Greece itself. This country has been imposing its own interests and policies on the Greek Cypriots, intervening constantly in a process which should have remained in the exclusive domain of the two national communities, and going even so far as to proclaim Cyprus as "part of the national territory of Greece".

When I met Your Excellency in New York on October 1, 1983, I informed you of the readiness of the Turkish Cypriot side to resume the intercommunal negotiating process within the existing valid basis and of the need I felt to meet the Greek Cypriot leader in a new summit, under your auspices, in order to identify the genuine intentions of the two sides for a federal solution through direct negotiations. This proposal was made in sincerity and good will, and the prospects of a negotiated settlement obviously depended on the reconfirmation of the joint intents and common understanding of the two sides with regard to the aims, the method and the basis and framework within which we would work.

We had hoped that this sincere offer of the Turkish Cypriot side would meet with an unequivocal immediate positive response and would be put to good use and thus help to pave the way for resumed negotiations. We are deeply disappointed with the totally irresponsible treatment this proposal has received from the Greek Cypriot leadership and the attempts to turn it into another futile exercise of political manoeuvring and familiar delaying tactics.

As I have personally expressed to Your Excellency, and stated publicly, the Turkish Cypriot People could not possibly remain under an uncertain political status for another 20 years and sacrifice its rights and its very existence to the whims of the Greek and Greek Cypriot leadership.

Therefore, my People have taken the legitimate step for re-defining their political status in the form of an independent and non-aligned Republic by exercising their natural right to self-determination.

It would have been easier to move towards a federal structure, which continues to be our aim, had the status and rights of the Turkish Cypriot People not been denied, had the Greek Cypriot side given support to the process of an agreed solution through negotiations, and the framework developed for this purpose. We all know this has not been so.

If there is one lesson to be drawn from our experiences in Cyprus (and from experiences in federalism throughout the world), it is that a true federation can only be established between equal partners having the same political status.

The Greek Cypriot side's main mistake has been to try to forget, and conceal from the world, the fact that the Turkish Cypriot People are not a mere "minority", but an equal co-founder partner.

In Cyprus, sovereignty has never been transferred only to one of the two co-founder communities, but to both of them. The "functional federal system" of 1960 has collapsed and the bi-zonal federation which could enable both communities to co-exist in peace, tranquillity, security and prosperity has not been achieved so far, because the Greek Cypriot side, blindly and obstinately, refused to recognise us as an equal co-founder partner.





NE MUTLU TÜRKÜM DİYELİ



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KURDUK  
İZ  
TACAĞIZ  
Kanka aldık bu hakka  
Cınla aldık bu hakka  
Dünyayı aldatanlar  
Aldatamazlar HAK ki

TÜRKİYE  
BANGLADEŞ TARTI  
PAKİS  
BİN 20 Yıl

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GÜCÜMÜZ  
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ELENİZİM  
İrkiçlikler.

ASLA  
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Cumhurbaşkanımız

Cumhurbaşkanımız  
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ISTANBUL AL...  
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INTRAPAK OF  
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NEREDEYDINIZ

CUMHURİYET  
TARİHİ  
TUTULMUŞTUR